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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [KNNP](#) [UN](#) [IR](#) [UK](#)
SUBJECT: IRAN: UK EXPECTS A FOURTH UNSCR WILL BE NECESSARY

REF: MAY 30 EMAIL EMB LONDON (GAYLE)-DEPT (NEA/IR AND
P STAFF)

Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connel
ly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: FCO working level contacts in informal conversations argue the likelihood that Iran will not respond in a useful fashion to Javier Solana's scheduled offer June 14 on behalf of the P5 1 will make a fourth UNSC resolution on Iran necessary. FCO contacts argue that whether a fourth resolution contains any new sanctions will be relatively unimportant, but that such a measure would have important symbolic value, and impress Iran, and should therefore be pursued, despite the likely reluctance of China. End summary.

¶2. (C) HMG believes a fourth UNSC Resolution on Iran will become necessary following the kind of ambiguous non-response, or even outright rejection, with which HMG expects Iran will greet Javier Solana's scheduled June 14 tender of the P5 1 offer, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Multilateral Team Leader Will Gelling told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) June 6.

¶3. (C) When Poloff expressed surprise, Gelling agreed that obtaining another UNSCR on Iran would require enormous diplomatic efforts, especially with the Chinese, who, according to Gelling, had specifically warned P5 1 partners that UNSCR 1803 would be the last one China could support.

¶4. (C) Gelling countered, however, that it would not be necessary to persuade the Chinese to accept any tough new measures against Iran, since even a resolution devoid of additional sanctions would have significant symbolic value. Gelling argued that, tangible economic pressure aside, the Iranians, because of their national pride and dislike for any appearance of international isolation, are more susceptible to international opprobrium than Western policy makers often appreciate. Gelling reasoned that the special Iranian need to be seen internationally in a positive light is a vulnerability Western policy makers should not overlook; the psychological dimension of Iran's relationship with the outside world, in HMG's view, gives multilateral measures, especially in the Security Council, a special status and impact.

Embassy Comment

¶5. (C/NF) Gelling's comment appeared to track closely the comments of UK Political Director Mark Lyall Grant during his meeting, on a range of topics, with USUN Ambassador Khalilzad May 30 (ref). It also tracks generally with informal working level statements made previously to Poloff by Grant's staff, and to Poloff more than once by the FCO's Iran Coordinator Antony Philippon, prior to UNSCR 1803's March 2008 passage, on the likely future trajectory of P5 1 efforts.

¶6. (C/NF) Gelling's June 6 comments about Iranian perceptions and the symbolic value of UN resolutions are

difficult to prove or disprove, but in general reflect a line of argument HMG has made since the beginning of the P5 1 process about Iranian psychology and Iran's continuing, longer-term search for prestige in the eyes of the world.

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